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Commercial health apps: in the user’s interest?
Study shows how sensitive data from health apps is finding its way to corporations
Claudia Pagliari senior lecturer in primary care
eHealth Research Group, Usher Institute of Population Health Sciences and Informatics, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK
Excitement about digital health is at an all time high, with
innovations in mobile personal computing, robotics, genomics,
artificial intelligence, cloud based infrastructure, and more,
promising to revolutionise the organisation, quality, cost
effectiveness, inclusivity, and personalisation of patient care.1 2
Amid this celebration, the shadow of privacy risks continues to
lurk, like an unwelcome guest at a party.3-5
In a linked paper, Grundy and colleagues (doi:10.1136/bmj.
l920) examine the surreptitious tracking and profiling of people
using medicines related apps, which can generate sensitive
health data.6
Grundy and colleagues used an “app store crawling program”
to identify the top 100 medicines related apps available to
Android mobile users in the UK, USA, Australia, and Canada,
combined with a search for endorsed apps on a medicines related
agency website, a health app library, a systematic review, and
their personal networks. Of the 821 apps screened, 24 met the
criteria of managing drugs (for example, information, decision
support, adherence, engagement), requesting at least one
“dangerous” permission, claiming to collect or share user data,
or requiring user interaction. These were tested multiple times,
using dummy user profiles representing professionals and
patients, to create a baseline, then the process was repeated,
each time changing one type of user information. Comparing
network traffic before and after the profile changes revealed
how the new data were being transmitted from the app. Next,
the authors used IP Lookup tools to identify the data recipients
and analysed their company information, privacy terms, data
sharing agreements, and business models. Recipients were
classified as first parties (app developers), third parties (external
entities receiving data from the app), and fourth parties
(organisations that receive and might aggregate data from
multiple third parties). Network analysis was then used to map
and visualise the pathways through which data are potentially
being shared.
“Dangerous” permissions
On average, apps requested four or more “dangerous”
permissions for private information held on the user’s phone,
or which affected the operation of other apps. Most transmitted
encrypted data, but several used clear text. Nineteen of the 24
apps shared user data, which were received by 55 unique third
parties. Third parties typically reserved the right to hold user
information for their own commercial purposes. Some collected
data from other apps, along with communications and
behavioural information, building detailed user profiles across
devices, which could be shared with business affiliates or sold
on. Although most third parties were developers, 33% were
advertising companies and 8% were investor owned. The fourth
party network included 237 entities, including “families” of
companies with the same owner. Of these, Alphabet (Google)
and Facebook were able to receive the most types of data, either
directly from the apps or through third parties, whereas
Alphabet, Amazon, and Microsoft received the highest volume
of app user data overall.
Although others have convincingly shown vast networks of data
leakage by Android apps,7 8 this study is unique in focusing on
apps that can yield highly sensitive information about people’s
use of or need for medicines. As the authors’ note, although
many of the data fields collected by these entities can seem
innocuous, in combination they can be used to uniquely identify
and profile users, effectively bypassing existing data protection
and privacy laws.
Such tracking practices differ for apps and online search
engines,7 but the dominant role of global corporations such as
Google is evident in both—as was also shown in another study
published this week on “ad tech surveillance on the public sector
web.”9 With these digital apex predators voraciously consuming
other companies and the data they generate, as well as the global
talent pool of data scientists able to make best use of them,
concepts such as “free market” and “democracy” are beginning
to look decidedly 20th century.
Exploitative practices
National Health Service patients may be cushioned from the
worst impacts of exploitative health data practices, unlike our
US cousins, but we are not immune. A shadow economy of
commercial data brokers is silently gleaning, linking, and
commoditising behavioural information about our health,
spending, political attitudes, movements, time spent online,
social networks, and so on, which is already influencing our
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mortgages, employment, travel, and more. With corporate data
brokers and public sector data centres now collaborating to
“understand society,” it is not overly fanciful to predict future
policy scenarios in which these insights affect our access to
drugs or place on a surgical waiting list. For now, the threats to
our privacy and self determination are arguably the most
important.
An EU ePrivacy regulation10 that extends the General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR)11 to web trackers and profiling
is under development, although it has been described as “sitting
in the sidings, being mobbed by lobbyists.”12 As the study
reported by Grundy and colleagues illustrates, issues of consent
and legitimate interest are muddied in the multiparty data
ecosystem of digital health apps. Meanwhile, the capacity of
regulators such as the Information Commissioner’s Office (https:
//ico.org.uk) to enforce the rules on privacy is severely
constrained by lack of manpower.13 Penalties for exploitative
data practices are typically applied only after incidents have
occurred, been spotted, and been reported, and it is likely that
the majority slip under the radar.
Nevertheless, there is a good news story hidden in this
work—for one thing, Grundy and colleagues showed that
companies were more likely to declare their data sharing
partnerships after the GDPR had come into force, albeit with
an eye on the back door. More importantly, all the studies
mentioned here show the value of digital forensic research
methods, for uncovering the illicit practices and business
relations underlying fine words about regulatory compliance.
With advances in technologies such as bots9 and AI,13 regulators
could soon have an effective dashboard of suspect apps and
websites. How they choose to respond to it is another matter,
but without more effort to tackle the problem, public trust in
digital health will continue to hold back its future.
CP leads the Interdisciplinary Research Group in eHealth, the MSc in Global
eHealth, and the consumer informatics theme of the NHS Digital Academy.
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